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Abstract
In this note I expand further on the main assumptions leading to the
consistent-amplitude approach to quantum theory and I offer a reply to
Jerry Finkelstein’s recent comment (quant-ph/9809017) concerning my
argument for the linearity of quantum mechanics (Phys. Rev. A57, 1572
(1998)).
The purpose of this note is twofold: it is intended as a reply to a recent
comment made by Jerry Finkelstein [1] on my work on the consistent-amplitude
approach to quantum theory (CAQT) [2][3][4] and, in the process, I will provide
a brief overview emphasizing the main assumptions behind the CAQT.
The objective of CAQT has been to justify the formalism of quantum theory
in the hope that this would not only clarify the formal connections among the
various postulates of quantum theory but also illuminate the issue of how the
formalism should be interpreted. In this respect the traditional approach has
been to first set up the formalism and then try to find out what it all means.
This problem of attributing a physical meaning to mathematical constructs is
a notoriously difficult one. A well known ancient example is the theory of
probability. There the subject of the mathematical structure of the theory has
been settled for a very long time but questions about the actual interpretation
– what a probability actually means – remain to this day very controversial.
So, rather than take the standard quantum theory as axiomatized, say by von
Neumann, and then, append to it an interpretation, the approach I have taken
has been to try to build the formalism and its interpretation simultaneously.
Thus, the hope is that by the time the formalism is completed, at least some
important interpretational issues will have been settled.
I will address Finkelstein’s comment in the context of a very brief summary:
CAQT is formulated as the only consistent way to manipulate the amplitudes
for quantum processes; the result is the standard quantum theory. We proceed
in several steps; effectively, each step represents an assumption. The first and
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most crucial assumption is a decision about the subject matter. What problem
is quantum mechanics trying to solve? We choose a pragmatic, operational
approach: statements about a system are identified with those experimental
setups designed to test them. Quoting from [3]: “Our goal is to predict the
outcomes of experiments and the strategy is to establish a network of relations
among setups in the hope that information about some setups might be helpful
in making predictions about others.” We find that there are two basic kinds of
relations among setups, which we call and and or. These relations or operations
represent our idealized ability to build more complex setups out of simpler ones,
either by placing them in “series” or in “parallel”. The identification of the
and/or relations, as well as their properties (associativity, distributivity, etc.)
is crucial to establishing the goal and the subject of quantum mechanics. The
first assumption is
A1. The goal of quantum theory is to predict the outcomes of experiments
involving setups built from parts connected through and and or.
It is important to emphasize that this quantum theory coincides with the stan-
dard Copenhagen quantum theory (see [5]). The contribution, at this point, has
been to make explicit the relations and/or which are normally implicit in the
Feynman approach.
The next step involves an assumption about the means for handling these
relations and/or quantitatively:
A2. We seek a mathematical representation of and/or by assigning to each
setup a a single complex number φ(a) in such a way that relations among
setups translate into relations among the corresponding complex numbers.
The requirement that a single complex number be assigned to a setup is
a consistency constraint: if there are two different ways to compute φ(a)
the two answers must agree.
Quoting from [2]: “There is no reason why such a representation should exist,
but if it does exist, and this is, perhaps, just another instance of the “unusual
effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences,” then there is no reason
not to take advantage of it.” And again, quoting from [3]: “Why should such
a representation exist? It need not, but all of physics consists of representing
elements of reality, or relations among these elements, or our information about
them, by mathematical objects. The existence of such representations may be
mysterious, but it is not surprising; there are too many examples.” The remark-
able consequence of the existence of one representation is the theorem that it is
always possible to switch to another one equivalent to it and considerably more
convenient in which and and or are respectively represented by multiplication
and addition. This is the main result of [2].
In [2], anticipating results to be obtained in the later sections of [3], such
as for example, the fact that the time evolution of these complex numbers is
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given by a linear Schro¨dinger-like equation and that their modulus squared
yields probabilities, I wrote “Complex numbers assigned in this way are called
‘amplitudes”’. In retrospect perhaps this was pedagogically misleading because
it suggests that refs. [2][3] can be summarized as follows: If one attributes
to quantum mechanical amplitudes, not only all those properties to which we
have become accustomed, but also the additional requirement that they provide
a representation for and/or then one finds the Schro¨dinger equation must be
linear or else the theory is inconsistent. Put in this way it is reasonable to
conclude as does Finkelstein [1]: “...Thus it is the demand that the amplitudes
form a ‘representation’ with which nonlinear theories are inconsistent.” But
one should not put it this way: I do not take the amplitudes we all know
and append an additional requirement, I take complex numbers which carry no
previous burden of preconceived meanings and are totally arbitrary except for
the only requirement that they provide a representation of and/or. To avoid
further misconceptions, in the rest of this note, I will refer to these complex
numbers after they have been suitably regraded so that the sum and product
rules hold, by CNs. Toward the end I will comment on the implications of the
interesting logical possibility that such a representation of and/or might not
exist.
Thus, CNs are tools for reasoning that encode information about how one
builds complicated setups by combining more elementary ones. Incidentally, as
a consequence of the sum and product rules, the time evolution of these CNs is
given by a linear equation, and this allows the introduction of a ‘CN -function’
(which I will eventually call the ‘wave function’) as a means to codify those
features of the setup prior to t that are relevant to time evolution after t. The
question of how CNs or the CN -function are used to predict the outcomes
of experiments is addressed through an assumption. The general interpretative
rule is:
A3. Suppose the CN -function of a setup is Ψ (t) and at time t one introduces
or removes a filter that blocks out those components of Ψ characterized
by a certain property P . Suppose further that this modification of the
setup has a negligible effect on the evolution of Ψ after t. Then when the
CN -function is Ψ (t) property P will not be detected. The rule applies to
CNs in general.
The application of this rule requires a criterion to quantify the change in CNs
when setups are modified. In ref. [3] the criterion adopted was to use the Hilbert
norm as the means to measure the distance between CN -functions. To justify
this Hilbert norm we argue that there is a uniquely natural notion of distance in
the linear space of CN -functions; it is given by the Hilbert inner product. The
argument exploits the fact that the components out of which setups are built,
the filters, already supply us with a notion of orthogonality. In order to fix the
inner product an additional assumption is needed. It is a form of the principle
of insufficient reason motivated by symmetry [4]:
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A4. If there is no reason to prefer one region of configuration space over another
they should be assigned equal a priori weight.
From the assumptions A3 and A4 one can prove that the probability of an
outcome in an experiment involving a certain setup is given by the modulus-
squared of the corresponding CN . This is the Born postulate.
The final step in the current state of development of the CAQT is a justifi-
cation of why the time evolution of the CN -functions in addition to being linear
must also be unitary. For this we must assume [4]:
A5. The experimental setups about which we wish to make predictions involve
no loss of information.
Since the objective of A5 is to specify more precisely what are the experimental
setups we are trying to make predictions about, it is in effect contributing to
define the subject of quantum theory. It may, therefore, be more appropriate
to include A5 as part of A1. In any case, in these setups entropy must be
conserved and this implies unitary time evolution. The only subtlety in this last
step concerns the identification of the proper entropy; it is the array entropy,
not von Neumann’s.
At this point the reader may judge whether the CNs introduced in the
CAQT for the sole purpose of representing and/or and which, with rather mild
and natural assumptions, have proved to be useful tools in predicting the results
of experiments deserve or not to be called ‘amplitudes’. My own inclination is
to define amplitudes in this way, i.e., as tools for dealing with and/or. I regard
this definition as being considerably more useful than alternative ones because
of the light it sheds on the issue of how amplitudes and wave functions should
be interpreted and on various connections among the usual quantum postulates.
As in all physical theories assumptions are unavoidable. An important issue
is whether the assumptions are sufficiently natural and compelling that one may
not wish to consider abandoning them. A related and somewhat less important
issue is that of deciding how many of these assumptions it is legitimate to give
up and still insist that the resulting theory be called a “quantum” theory. Some
practitioners of quantum theory would insist that theories violating assumption
A1 may be “theories” but are not “quantum theories”. Thus, on the ques-
tion of whether nonlinear quantum theories are consistent or not I wrote [3]:
“Non-linear variants of quantum mechanics that preserve the notion of ampli-
tudes violate natural requirements of consistency. The question of whether it is
possible to formulate non-linear versions of quantum mechanics should not be
formulated as a dynamical question about which non-linear terms one is allowed
to add to the Schro¨dinger equation, but rather it should be phrased as a deeper
kinematical question about whether quantum mechanics should be formulated
in terms of mathematical objects other than amplitudes and wave functions.
However, whatever the nature of those mathematical objects the requirement
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that they be manipulated in a consistent manner should be maintained.” Natu-
rally, the meaning that I attributed then and now to the words ‘amplitude’ and
‘wave function’ is that of CNs and CN -functions.
We conclude with some comments about the interesting possibility that the
representation assumed inA2might not exist. For the purpose of this discussion
it is convenient to classify quantum theories into three classes:
(a) Theories that satisfy both A1 and A2.
(b) Theories that satisfy A1 but do not satisfy A2.
(c) Theories that do not satisfy A1.
This covers all possibilities.
The type-(a) theory is conventional quantum theory: its goal is to predict the
outcomes of experiments involving setups built from parts connected through
and and or, and since there exists a representation of and/or there is no reason
why one should not take advantage of it to construct a linear quantum theory.
Could one, in addition to the linear theory, also build a nonlinear theory and
use it to make predictions for these same setups? Perhaps, but the predictions
of this non-linear variant would either have to agree with those of the linear
theory and be equivalent to it (probably just a change of variables), or else risk
being inconsistent. Thus, “nonlinear variants of type-(a) quantum theory are
inconsistent”. Of course, there remains a tiny loophole provided by the logical
possibility that any of assumptions A3-A5 might not hold.
Theories of type (b) are those which agree with type-(a) theories as to the
subject matter but for which no representation of and/or exists. These are, I
believe, the theories to which Finkelstein might have been referring to (he raises
no objections against A1). One thing that can be said about these type-(b)
theories is that they must apply to systems that are sufficiently complicated
that the linear quantum theory does not exist. The point is that if the linear
quantum theory existed it would provide us with a representation for and/or in
contradiction with the hypothesis that A2 is violated. Notice that the situation
here is not that there exists a conceivable linear theory that must however
be discarded on the grounds that it disagrees with experiment. The situation
is more extreme: the linear theory does not exist. The question then becomes
whether the set of type-(b) theories is empty or not: the cases of a single particle
and other simple systems are excluded, for quantum fields the situation is not
so clear.
Finally, type-(c) theories violateA1 and could very well be nonlinear. These
theories include all realistic theories that have the more ambitious goal of pro-
viding a direct description of physical reality. Most proposals for nonlinear
theories appear to be of this kind. Type-(c) theories also include those that
seek the more modest goal of predicting the outcomes of experiments involving
setups which however are not built from parts connected through and and or.
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My own conclusion is that in the process of achieving consistency for nonlin-
ear quantum theories so much must be abandoned that by the time the resulting
nonlinear theory is ‘consistent’ it no longer remains ‘quantum’.
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